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Insurance
by Stephen L. Cotter*
and

C. Bradford Marsh**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although last year the Georgia General Assembly actively worked on
managed care and the appellate courts stymied subrogors, legislation
was light and appellate litigation routine this survey year. Many
appellate opinions were reminders of coverage processing requirements
(send the sixty-day "bad faith" demand for payment). Other opinions
applied established insurance law principles to particular fact patterns
(does every road wreck in Georgia have an appellate coverage decision?).
All concerned are having some difficulty adjusting to Georgia's gradual
departure from the traditional "four corners" coverage test analysis. The
supreme court did breathe life into the hope for liability coverage for
sexual harassment, ebbing the tide of adverse coverage opinions.
II.

HOMEOWNERS

In a dozen cases, the court of appeals refined the meanings of the
"intentional act" exclusion and the "business pursuits" exclusion while
also enforcing other terms and conditions of homeowners' policies, given
the evidentiary records presented.

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (A.B., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia,
American Bar Association, Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, Defense Research
Institute, International Association of Defense Counsel.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., 1981; J.D., 1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Georgia Defense
Lawyers Association; Defense Research Institute; American Bar Association.
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Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Garzone' defined "a
builders' risk" policy when no previous Georgia case or statute offered a
definitive meaning.'
Garzon, a builder, had a speculative home
destroyed by fire. Garzon demanded the insurer pay the face amount of
the policy under section 33-32-5(a) of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), which mandates such payment for the total loss
of a residential structure while exempting a builder's risk policy.'
Finding the contractor's speculative dwelling was still under construction, the court deemed the policy a builders' risk policy.4 It is not
necessary in Georgia for a builders' risk policy to have a "permission to
complete" clause in the policy.5
Two decisions enforced, as a matter of law, the "intentional act"
exclusion. First, in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Vanuss,6 a complaint alleging intentional, repeated violations of
riparian rights was sufficient as a matter of law to demand a declaration
of noncoverage v While stressing that City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.8 extends an insurer's obligation to consider facts
beyond the four corners of the complaint if the insured notifies the
insurer of such additional facts, the court found that the insured had not
put the carrier on notice of any mitigating facts.9 This decision points
out the advisability of tendering early not only the suit papers, but also
the insured's side of the story, so an insurer's duty to defend might be
extended and invoked, if appropriate. Second, the court of appeals in
Brown v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co." again enforced intentional act
policy terms creating a joint obligation between coinsureds in a difficult
fact pattern.1' Plaintiff, Louise Brown, had her home and its contents
damaged by her estranged husband, Johnny Mack Brown. Both Johnny
and Louise Brown were on the deed and the mortgage.1 The insured,
Louise Brown, argued that the intentional act clause, which excluded
intentional acts "by or at the direction of an insured" did not apply
because her estranged husband had quit-claimed his interest in the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

240 Ga. App. 304, 523 S.E.2d 386 (1999).
Id. at 305, 523 S.E.2d at 387.
O.C.G.A. § 33-32-5(a) (1996).
240 Ga. App. at 304-05, 523 S.E.2d at 386.
Id. at 306, 523 S.E.2d at 388.
243 Ga. App. 26, 532 S.E.2d 135 (2000).
Id. at 27, 532 S.E.2d at 136.
231 Ga. App. 206, 498 S.E.2d 782 (1998).
243 Ga. App. at 27, 532 S.E.2d at 136.
239 Ga. App. 251, 519 S.E.2d 726 (1999).
Id. at 254, 519 S.E.2d at 728-29.
Id. at 252, 519 S.E.2d at 727.
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property. 3 The court found that by reason of continued joint exposure
on the mortgage, Johnny Brown did have an insurable interest, and,
hence, the consequences of his intentional acts were excluded. 4 The
court followed Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. v. Dean, 5 which held that
the phrase "an insured" created a joint obligation.'"
The court in
Fireman's Fund distinguished Richards v. Hanover Insurance Co. 7
because the latter held that an intentional act clause employing a
different phrase, "the insured," created a several obligation, which would
not penalize the innocent coinsured.'8
The courts further defined the term "business pursuit" in the absence
of policy definitions. In Larson v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co.,'9 the insurer denied coverage under the homeowner's
policy of an electrical engineer and owner of a machine-shop fabrication
business that built hydraulic cable lifts for automobiles and motorcycles.
The insured based the claim on exposure relating to his first and only
cable car system. The electrical engineer constructed the cable car
system for cost plus twenty percent, and numerous aspects of the
insured's ongoing business were involved in the fabrication and
construction.2" As in the seminal case of Brown v. PeninsularFire
Insurance Co.,2 the homeowners' policy lacked a definition of "business
pursuits." Following Brown's use of the Webster's New International
Dictionary definition of a business as "'a usu[al] commercial or
mercantile activity,'" the court found that this insured's "principal
vocation consisted of machine work and building lifts."22 Hence, the
"business pursuits" exclusion applied to deny coverage.23 The court
distinguished Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Duncan,24 wherein
an auto mechanic's auto racing activities were not incident to the usual
mechanic's work, and Brown, wherein a real estate broker was not

13. Id. at 253, 519 S.E.2d at 727 (emphasis in orignal).
14. Id. at 254, 519 S.E.2d at 728-29.
15. 212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
16. 239 Ga. App. at 254, 519 S.E.2d at 729 (citing Fireman'sFund, 212 Ga. App. at 264,
441 S.E.2d at 43) (emphasis in original).

17.
18.
S.E.2d
19.
20.
21.
22.

250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
212 Ga. App. at 264, 441 S.E.2d at 437 (citing Richards, 250 Ga. at 615-16, 299
at 563-64).
238 Ga. App. 674, 520 S.E.2d 45 (1999).
Id. at 674, 520 S.E.2d at 46.
171 Ga. App. 507, 320 S.E.2d 208 (1984).
238 Ga. App. at 675, 520 S.E.2d at 47 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-

TIONAL DICTIONARY 302 (1961)).

23. Id. at 676, 520 S.E.2d at 47.
24. 131 Ga. App. 761, 206 S.E.2d 672 (1974).

306

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

considered customarily engaged in property development.25 In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Erwin,26 the court held that an
occupation, within the meaning of the business pursuits exclusion, could
be nothing more than attempting to find a job.2" After the insured had
been terminated from her position with a law firm, her former employer
asserted defamation claims against her, all of which allegedly arose out
of matters following termination. 2s Keying in on Jefferson Insurance
Co. of New York v. Dunn,29 the court stressed that the focus must be on
the acts themselves and their connection to furthering the insured's
business at the time of their commission.30 The court specifically noted
that "[n]one of the alleged tortious acts arose out of or was logically
Hence, posttermination
connected with her looking for a job." 3'
statements and actions would not seem to be barred by the business
pursuits exclusion under the Erwin ruling.
The court of appeals further refined the "negligent entrustment"
exclusion for motorized land vehicles, having previously held that this
exclusion was not vague or ambiguous. 2 In Georgia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co. v.Huncke,3 an ATV operated by a nonrelative,
nonresident of the insured caused injury four hundred yards from the
insured's residence. 34 The only arguable exception to the exclusion of
the entrustment by the insured of a motorized land conveyance was
exception four, which stated that the entrustment exclusion did not
apply to a "conveyance not subject to motor vehicle registration which is
35
The court found that an
... used -to service an insured's residence."
ATV used for children's recreation and to scout fields was not "used to
service an insured's residence."36 While recreational use may be a
applies when the recreational
benefit to the insured, the exception
37
benefit is related to the residence.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
(1996).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

238 Ga. App. at 676, 520 S.E.2d at 47.
240 Ga. App. 816, 525 S.E.2d 393 (1999).
Id. at 818, 525 S.E.2d at 394.
Id. at 817, 525 S.E.2d at 396.
269 Ga. 213, 496 S.E.2d 696 (1998).
240 Ga. App. at 818, 525 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 818, 525 S.E.2d at 393-95.
Nalley v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 221 Ga. App. 537, 539, 472 S.E.2d 82, 84
240 Ga. App. 580, 524 S.E.2d 302 (1999).
Id. at 580, 524 S.E.2d at 302.
Id. at 581, 524 S.E.2d at 303.
Id.
Id.
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The courts considered a variety of conditions to homeowners' policies.
In Parks v. State Farm General Insurance Co.," the court enforced an
unwritten clause requiring the insured to bring any actions against the
insurer within one year of the loss. 9 Because the coverage was
provided as a binder, or temporary insurance, it was governed by
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-33 and "'deemed to include all the usual terms
of the policy."' 4 ° Testimony was uncontradicted that41State Farm would
have incorporated such a clause in a written policy.
In Williams v. Mayflower Insurance Co.,42 another insured unsuccessfully attempted to avoid a "nonassignment" clause. The insured tried to
avoid the clause by asserting that premiums had been paid and,
therefore, the insured performed his obligations under the policy.43 The
appeals court refused to consider this issue because it was not raised in
the lower court, despite substantive support for the avoidance of a
nonassignment clause in such circumstances. 4 Insureds fared better
with giving notice of the occurrence. In Newberry v. Cotton States
Mutual Insurance Co.,45 a year after a physical altercation occurred, an
intentional tort claim was filed against insured Newberry. Cotton States
received timely notice of the lawsuit, but it claimed that the insured's
delay of more than a year in giving notice of the occurrence breached his
obligation to provide timely notice. 46 As is customarily the case in this
area, the court found a jury question existed, noting that the insured
raised two excuses sufficient to submit the issue to a jury: 1) the
insured's belief that the matter would be handled under a workers'
compensation claim; and 2) the insured's belief that the policy would not
afford coverage for the given factual ' situation.47
While the first
justification for not reporting a remote tort liability theory is clearly
established in Georgia law, the second justification seems to legitimize
a plea of ignorance that previously has not been considered a justification for failing to report the occurrence."

38. 238 Ga. App. 814, 520 S.E.2d 494 (1999).
39. Id. at 816, 520 S.E.2d at 495.
40. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 33-24-33 (1996)).
41. Id.
42. 238 Ga. App. 581, 519 S.E.2d 506 (1999).
43. Id. at 583, 519 S.E.2d at 508.
44. Id. (citing Mail Concepts, Inc. v. Foot & Davies, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 778, 781, 409
S.E.2d 567, 569 (1991)).
45. 242 Ga. App. 784, 531 S.E.2d 362 (2000).
46. Id. at 784, 531 S.E.2d at 362.
47. Id. at 785-86, 531 S.E.2d at 363.
48. See, e.g., Protective Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 256 Ga. 713, 714, 352 S.E.2d 760, 761
(1987) (holding that mere ignorance of the terms of a policy is not a justification).
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ACCIDENT, HEALTH, AND LIFE INSURANCE

Last year's legislative activity in the area of managed care/health
insurance has not yet brought cases to the appellate courts. Only one
follow-up piece of legislation49 was passed, which requires public access
to updated provider lists every sixty days.5" Senate Bill 464"' declares
discrimination against a victim of "family violence" in accepting an
application, insuring, renewing, or terminating a policy as unfair." It
also disallows inquiry into or the disclosure or transfer of information
regarding an applicant's or insured's status as a victim of family
violence.5"
A.

Health Insurance
In the area of health insurance case law, several interesting opinions
of the court of appeals discussed and decided how and to what extent
providers could be paid or were restricted in receiving payments. In
54

Health Horizons, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,

the court, through Judge Eldridge, dispatched several technical defenses
offered by State Farm to a fraud suit filed by Health Horizon, Inc., a
provider.55 In a long analysis of the consequences of failing to obtain a
certificate of authority, the court held that the purpose behind O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-1502(a), which requires the certificate, is satisfied by
compelling the issuance of a certificate of authority at some time in the
litigation.56 Perhaps more significantly, the court clearly held that not
only did State Farm lack the authority to raise the defense that a
business corporation was improperly practicing one of the so-called
"learned professions" (this defense could only be raised by the composite
State Board of Medical Examiners), but that nothing prohibits a
provider, having earned its fees for professional services, "from assigning
such choices in action to a for-profit corporation for purposes of
administration, billing, and collection of such fees."57 Those adminis-

49. S. 432, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000).
50. Id. § 2(a)(4).
51. S. 464, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000).
52. Id. § 1.
53. Id.
54. 239 Ga. App. 440, 521 S.E.2d 383 (1999).
55. Id. at 440-41, 521 S.E.2d at 384-85.
56. Id. at 443, 521 S.E.2d at 386 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1502(a) (1994)). Late
registration does not bar suit by a foreign corporation because late registration amounts
to "substantial compliance with the statutory scheme." Id.
57. Id. at 447-48, 521 S.E.2d at 389.
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trative activities apparently are thought not to interfere with the
physician-patient relationship-specifically, "The corporation is not
practicing medicine under such limited circumstances.""' This opinion
gives apparent license for many types of professional fee collection
arrangements, some of which seem abusive as applied in practice. By
limiting the enforcement of such prohibition on the practice of the
learned professions to one state agency, except in the most blatant and
known circumstances, timely and effective enforcement seems improbable.
Another provider, a hospital, won in its attempt to recover fully the
face amount, $786.10, of its hospital bill in the form of a lien, even
though the hospital agreed to charge and accepted its flat fee, $216 from
Kaiser Permanente Insurance.5 9 The injured party and insured was
faced with the "voluntary payment" doctrine. She had satisfied the lien
in full without then objecting thereto.6 ° The court distinguished several
persuasive authorities wherein the challenge to a hospital's alleged
inappropriate lien was timely preserved by timely initiating or participating in interpleader or debt actions to recoup the alleged inappropriate
increment.6 1 To add insult to injury, the court rejected the insured's
claim for a reduction by a pro rata share of attorney fees she incurred
in obtaining reimbursement.6 2 The court noted that it is well established that each litigant is generally obliged to bear her own attorney
fees and, in any event, the litigant waived this position by not paying
under protest.63 The decision seems to invite objection, protest, and
timely initiation of litigation to preserve these positions.
Life Insurance

B.

In the area of life insurance, the appellate courts continued to
interpret and apply terms of life insurance policies as unambiguous, as
a matter of law, and without the aid of jury interpretation. To avoid an
apparently unintended windfall to the surviving spouse of a deceased
partner, the court of appeals looked to the intent of two deceased
partners to resolve an ambiguity as to the ownership of a life insurance
policy." The first partner, Dunn, died in an automobile accident. The
remaining partner, Erhardt, received the proceeds of a life insurance

58.
59.

Id.
Watts v. Promina Gwinnett Health Sys., 242 Ga. App. 377, 530 S.E.2d 14 (2000).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 378, 530 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 379-80, 530 S.E.2d at 15-16.
Id.
Id. at 381, 530 S.E.2d at 17.
Dunn v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins., 242 Ga. App. 903, 531 S.E.2d 761 (2000).
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policy on Dunn that was purchased to allow Dr. Erhardt to buy out the
partnership interests that had devolved on Dunn's wife. When Erhardt
later died, both Mrs. Dunn and Mrs. Erhardt claimed onwership of a
policy on Erhardt's life. Mrs. Dunn pointed to correspondence and
evidence in the application that showed Mr. Dunn as the owner of the
policy on Erhardt. 5 The court discounted that troublesome evidence
and found Mrs. Erhardt to be the owner.66 Thus, the court prevented
Mrs. Dunn from benefiting from both policies, a result it concluded was
unintended by both partners."
In Barnes v. Greater Georgia Life Insurance Co.,6 the court found
that D.U.I. constitutes a crime sufficient to meet the "crime" exclusion
of a life insurance policy. 9
The deceased perished in a two-car
accident while driving in a near alcohol coma (.27 blood alcohol level)
and with an unspecified amount of marijuana in his blood. The insurer
successfully avoided paying benefits under the policy's accidental death
provision based on an exclusion: "The Insurer will not pay for any loss
caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, by ... committing, or
attempting to commit a crime."7 ° The court of appeals held that the
word "crime" is unambiguous.7
It looked to statutory law for the
definition of crime: "'a violation of a statute ... in which there is a joint
operation of an act or omission to act and an intention or criminal
negligence."' 72 The court was unpersuaded by a Sixth Circuit decision
that found the word "crime" ambiguous because the insured is likely to
understand it as meaning no more than such felonies as burglary, armed
robbery, or murder.73
IV.
A.

AUTOMOBILE

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

The court of appeals articulated the correct legal standard for due
diligence for service by publication under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(e) in

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

1990)).

Id. at 905, 531 S.E.2d at 763.
Id. at 905-06, 531 S.E.2d at 763.
Id.
243 Ga. App. 149, 530 S.E.2d 748 (2000).
Id. at 149, 530 S.E.2d at 748.
Id., 530 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 150, 530 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1 (1999)).
Id. (citing American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Bilyeu, 91 F.2d 87,88-90 (6th Cir.
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Wilson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 4 and Brown v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." Wilson sued Strong, an
uninsured motorist for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision.
Wilson timely served a copy of the complaint on her uninsured motorist
carrier, State Farm, but was never able to perfect personal service on
Strong. After a showing of diligence on her part and of concealment to
avoid service on Strong's part, Wilson obtained an order allowing service
by publication. State Farm, answering in its own name, moved to set
aside the order and to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that Wilson
had not acted diligently in attempting personally to serve Strong."
The court of appeals found that the correct legal standard for due
diligence for service by publication under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(e) was
"diligence in determining that Strong was either out of state or avoiding
service and not the standard of diligence for relation back of personal
service obtained after the statute of limitation has run."77 The record
showed substantial, repeated, and prolonged efforts not only to locate
defendant Strong, but also to serve her as soon as possible.7" These
efforts satisfied the requirement of due diligence under O.C.G.A. section
33-7-11(e) according to the court.79 A strongly worded dissent by Judge
Marion T. Pope indicated that from the time of the order for service by
publication until the court's dismissal order ten months later, plaintiff
made no effort to locate defendant Strong.80 The dissent took the view
that the plaintiff must remain diligent in attempting to personally serve
the alleged tortfeasor despite service by publication.8 '
In Brown State Farm was successful on a motion to dismiss for
plaintiff's failure to obtain personal service on the uninsured motorist.
Five days before the running of the statute of limitations, Brown brought
suit against Snow for injuries arising from a car accident. Although
Brown served State Farm, her uninsured motorist carrier, she never
served Snow. After three months State Farm filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that plaintiff had failed properly to serve defendant. Brown did
not move for service by publication until a month after the motion. 2
The court found no evidence of any effort to locate or serve defendant
Snow for three months between the initial failed attempt and State

74. 239 Ga. App. 168, 520 S.E.2d 917 (1999).
75. 242 Ga. App. 313, 529 S.E.2d 439 (2000).
76. 239 Ga. App. at 168, 520 S.E.2d at 917.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 171, 520 S.E.2d at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174, 520 S.E.2d at 922 (Pope, J., dissenting).

Id. at 175, 520 S.E.2d at 923.

82. 242 Ga. App. at 314, 529 S.E.2d at 441.
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Farm's motion to dismiss. 8 3 The court cited Wilson for the proposition
that the plaintiff must show due diligence in determining whether the
defendant was either out of state or avoiding service under O.C.G.A.
section 33-7-11(e).84
Brown also unsuccessfully argued that it was against public policy to
allow the uninsured motorist carrier to move to dismiss the action based
on failure to serve defendant when the action had been properly served
on the carrier. 85 The court of appeals, finding no merit to Brown's
argument, indicated that the "purpose of uninsured motorist legislation
is to require some provision for first-party insurance coverage to
facilitate indemnification for injuries to a person who is legally entitled
to recover damages from an uninsured motorist, and thereby to protect
innocent victims from the negligence of irresponsible drivers."86 While
the known motorist is deemed uninsured when he cannot be personally
served, a plaintiff is not "legally entitled to recover damages from the
uninsured motorist" unless he serves the defendant by publication and
87
reduces his claim against the defendant to a judgment.
In Manzi v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co., 88 the court of
appeals upheld the dismissal of an uninsured motorist suit based upon
the insured's failure to comply with the notice provision in her insurance
policy. 89 Manzi filed suit against an uninsured motorist and served
Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co., her uninsured motorist carrier,
with the lawsuit more than six months after the accident. The
complaint was Cotton States' first notice of the accident. 90 Cotton
States' policy included a provision, "Duties After an Accident or Loss"
providing "we must be notified promptly, but in no event later than sixty
days, of how, when and where the accident or loss happened."91 The
court of appeals held that this notice provision applied to all claims
under the policy, including uninsured motorist claims.92 The court
concluded that the policy language requiring prompt notice of "how,
when and where the accident or loss occurred," clearly implied that the
sixty-day period would begin on the date of the accident or loss.93

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. (citing Wilson, 239 Ga. App. at 171, 520 S.E.2d 920).
Id.
Id. at 315, 529 S.E.2d at 441.
Id.
243 Ga. App. 277, 531 S.E.2d 164 (2000).
Id. at 277, 531 S.E.2d at 165.
Id. at 277-78, 531 S.E.2d at 165.
Id. at 277, 531 S.E.2d at 166.
Id. at 278, 531 S.E.2d at 166.
Id. at 280, 531 S.E.2d at 166.
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Uninsured Motorist Subrogation

The Georgia Court of Appeals was presented with an issue of first
impression in this state: Does the two-year statute of limitations for a
personal injury claim apply to an insurer who brings a subrogation
action under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(f) 9 4 to recover for the uninsured
motorist personal injury payments it made to its insured, or does section
33-7-11(f) create a statutory right of subrogation that gives the insurer,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-3-22, 95 twenty years from the date of the
collision to file a suit?96 The court of appeals decided that under the
"plain and unequivocal" language of O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(f) the
insurer is bound by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to the
insured to whom the insurer is subrogated. 9' Safeco paid its insured,
Richmond, for damages sustained as a result of a collision with Whirl,
an uninsured motorist. More than two years after the collision, Safeco
instituted a subrogation action against Whirl to recover both the
property damage and personal injury uninsured motorist benefits paid
to Richmond. Whirl timely answered and raised the two-year statute of
limitations for personal injuries. Safeco argued that the uninsured
motorist statute created a statutory right of action and, thus, a twentyyear statute of limitations would apply.9" The court of appeals held
that under the uninsured motorist statute, the insurer's rights,
limitations, and defenses are the same as the insured's. 99 Accordingly,
the insurer as subrogee stands in the shoes of the insured and is bound
by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury action.10 0
Landrum v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 1° 1 also
dealt with uninsured motorist subrogation. King sued Landrum for
damages arising out of an automobile accident. King's uninsured
motorist carrier, State Farm, filed a cross claim against Landrum for
indemnity or repayment of any award King collected from State Farm
under King's uninsured motorist coverage. Prior to the trial, Landrum's
automobile liability insurer tendered its policy limits to King. After a
jury award to King and after the jury was released, the trial court
entered judgment for State Farm against Landrum on State Farm's cross

94.

O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f) (2000).

95. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (1982).
96. Whirl v. Safeco Ins. Co., 241 Ga. App. 654, 527 S.E.2d 262, 263 (1999).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 658, 527 S.E.2d at 265-66.
Id. at 657-58, 527 S.E.2d at 262-64.
Id. at 656, 527 S.E.2d at 264-65.
Id. at 658, 527 S.E.2d at 266.
241 Ga. App. 787, 527 S.E.2d 637 (2000).
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claim. Landrum argued that because plaintiff King did not receive full
compensation, State Farm could not assert subrogation rights against
After much discussion of the right of subrogation and the
Landrum.'
full compensation rule, the appellate court indicated that State Farm
had not sought reimbursement from King, the injured party, nor had it
claimed any portion of the amount awarded to King. °3 State Farm
was exercising its statutory subrogation rights pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 33-7-11(f) and sought reimbursement from the tortfeasor for the
amount it paid to King. 4 The court of appeals found that the full
compensation rule did not defeat State Farm's subrogation rights under
the circumstances.0 5 The court was persuaded by some key facts: The
release signed by King for money received from Landrum's carrier
specifically reserved State Farm's rights to make a claim against
Landrum. 6 Because of the release, King had no further claim against
Landrum, so State Farm would not be depriving King of any compensation he could get from Landrum."7
Policy Construction
The Georgia Court of Appeals required Georgia Farm Bureau to pay
an accidental death benefit to a mother for the death of her child under
a policy on a car that was not involved in the accident that killed her
Jackson, the insured, had two vehicles, a Taurus and a Geo,
child.'
insured under separate policies. Only the policy on the Geo had an
accidental death benefit. Jackson's child was struck by another vehicle
on the driver's side door and killed while Jackson was driving the
Taurus. Jackson made a claim under the Geo policy for the accidental
death benefit. 9 The accidental death benefit was contained in a
separate endorsement and provided:
C.

The company will pay insured's injury coverage benefits for ...
"accidental death benefit" incurred with respect to "bodily injury"
sustained by an "eligible injured person" caused by an accident ....
When used in reference to this coverage "accidental death benefit"
means death resulting directly and independently of all other causes

102. Id. at 788, 527 S.E.2d at 638.
103. Id. at 787-88, 527 S.E.2d at 638.
104. Id. at 789, 527 S.E.2d at 639.
105. Id. at 788, 527 S.E.2d at 638.
106. Id. at 787, 527 S.E.2d at 638.
107. Id. at 789, 527 S.E.2d at 639.
108. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 240 Ga. App. 127, 130, 522 S.E.2d
716, 719 (1999).
109. Id. at 127, 522 S.E.2d at 717.
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from "bodily injury" caused by an accident while "occupying" or being
struck by a "motor vehicle."1 '

Georgia Farm argued that the phrase "struck by a motor vehicle"
Relying upon the often
referred to being struck while a pedestrian.'
stated rule that the test is what a reasonable person in the shoes of the
insured would understand, the court of appeals held that being struck
by an automobile while occupying another automobile was sufficient to
invoke the coverage." 2 The court of appeals also held that Georgia
Farm was subject to the imposition of a twenty-five percent penalty for
nonpayment within sixty days of demand, finding that the refusal was
in bad faith when the company did not raise the 13doubtful question until
many months after the initial claim was made."
D. Permissive Use
In Hartford Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,"'
the court of appeals found that a question of fact remained on the scope
of permission in a "second permittee" situation." 5 Hartford sued
Nationwide and each claimed that the other provided coverage for the
subject incident. Nationwide's policy extended coverage to persons who
use the insured automobile with the policyholder's permission.
Nationwide's insured allowed her employee to use a vehicle insured by
Nationwide, and the employee allowed another to drive the vehicle.
After an accident with Hartford's insured, Nationwide claimed that the
driver did not have permission to use the vehicle and, therefore, was not
an insured. Hartford claimed otherwise as this was a "second permittee"
situation." 6 The court of appeals repeated the rule:
where a third person uses a vehicle with a consent of another person
who has permission from the owner, the fact that the third person did
not have express or implied permission from the owner is irrelevant.
the permission then it is
"As long as the use falls within the scope of
117
permissive within the policy terminology."

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
(1994)).

Id., 522 S.E.2d at 717-18.
Id. at 128, 522 S.E.2d at 718.
Id. at 129, 522 S.E.2d at 718.
Id. at 130, 522 S.E.2d at 719.
240 Ga. App. 228, 523 S.E.2d 71 (1999).
Id. at 228, 523 S.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 229, 523 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wood, 211 Ga. App. 662, 663, 440 S.E.2d 78, 80
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However, the court of appeals held that the scope of the permission was
unclear, and thus, no questions of fact existed for a jury to resolve. 1 '
D. Reimbursement ProvisionI Complete CompensationRule
In Davis v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan of Georgia"9 the supreme
court claimed it cleared up any lingering questions dealing with the
state's public policy on complete compensation. 20 The court held:
[lt is now clear that the public policy of this state will not permit
insurers to require an insured to agree to a provision that permits the
insurer, at the expense of the insured, to avoid the risk for which the
insurer has been paid by requiring the insured to reimburse the
insurer whether or not the insured was completely compensated for the
covered loss. 21
Davis was injured in an automobile collision and suffered damages in
excess of $100,000. Davis settled her claim against the other driver for
the limits of his policy, $15,000, and collected $85,000 from her own
uninsured motorist carrier. Her health insurance carrier, Kaiser, sought
reimbursement for the amounts paid for Davis' medical expenses of
$40,361.42.122 While the court of appeals found no problem with the
contract provision requiring reimbursement of the insurer without
regard to whether the insured was completely compensated, the supreme
court found otherwise. 123 Adopting the reasoning of an Alabama
Supreme Court decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that Kaiser's
reimbursement provision was unenforceable as violative of public
policy. 124

This decision along with O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.112s

removes any doubt that the insured must be completely compensated
before any reimbursement provision will be applicable.
E. Fraud
In Infinity Insurance Co. v. Martin,'126 the insured was awarded
damages for fraud, conversion, attorney fees, and expenses of litigation

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
2d 772,
125.
126.

Id. at 230, 523 S.E.2d at 73.
271 Ga. 508, 521 S.E.2d 815 (1999).
Id. at 508, 521 S.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 510, 521 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. at 508-09, 521 S.E.2d at 816.
Id. at 509, 521 S.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 511, 521 S.E.2d at 818 (citing Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So.
777 (Ala. 1990)).
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (Supp. 2000).
240 Ga. App. 609, 524 S.E.2d 294 (1999).
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arising out of alleged fraud in the sale and cancellation of an auto
liability insurance policy. Martin applied for an Infinity insurance policy
through Ragan Insurance Agency. She paid a premium and signed the
application. After receipt of the application, Infinity adjusted her
insurance premium upward on two occasions. While she paid the first
premium increase, she did not pay the second premium increase. Some
months later, Infinity canceled her insurance for nonpayment of the
second increase.'27 The court of appeals concluded that the jury could
have found misrepresentation by the insurance company for failure to
give Martin a reasonable explanation for the premium increase. 2 '
In a declaratory judgment action that focused on a "nonowned vehicle"
exclusion, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Czaplicki'29 the court of appeals
asserted that the task for determining coverage is whether the vehicle's
use materially increased the insurer's risk without a corresponding
increase in the insured's premium."3
Allstate contended that an
automobile insurance policy covering Czaplicki as a resident of his
father's household excluded coverage for a wreck that occurred while
Czaplicki drove his grandfather's van, a nonowned vehicle. Allstate
argued that coverage under the father's policy was excluded by the
following language: "'Allstate will not pay for any damages a person
insured is legally obligated to pay because of ....
a non-owned auto
which is furnished or available for the regular use of a person insured."' 31" Because the parties had stipulated that Czaplicki drove the
van only occasionally, the nonowned auto exclusion did not apply.'32
The court of appeals upheld a "rented to others" exclusion in Empire
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.'33 A
passenger in a vehicle insured by Empire was injured in an auto
collision and sued the driver of the other vehicle. After a default
judgment was entered against the driver, State Farm was added as a
defendant, because it insured the other vehicle. The owner and driver
of the State Farm insured vehicle admitted that the driver rented the
vehicle for a charge.'
State Farm's policy included the following
exclusion: "'There is no coverage: (1) while any vehicle insured under

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 609-10, 524 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 612, 524 S.E.2d at 296.
241 Ga. App. 247, 526 S.E.2d 78 (1999).
Id. at 248, 526 S.E.2d at 79.
Id. at 247, 526 S.E.2d at 78.
Id.
241 Ga. App. 376, 525 S.E.2d 741 (1999).
Id. at 376, 525 S.E.2d at 741.
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it was
this section is (a) rented to others ... for a charge. ' 135 Because
136
undisputed that the vehicle was rented, no coverage existed.
Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Coleman 37 was a declaratory
judgment action regarding the following exclusion in an automobile
policy:
We do not provide liability coverage for "bodily injury" and "property
damage" to you or any family members residing in your household. (1)
If Intra-Familial Tort Immunity applies; or (2) To the extent the limits
required by law
of liability of this coverage exceed the limits of liability
38
if Intra-Familial Tort Immunity does not apply.1
Coleman, a Cotton States insured, died in a collision while riding in his
own vehicle being driven with Coleman's permission by Robert Reeves,
who was not a member of Coleman's family. Coleman's heirs filed suit
against Reeves alleging that Reeves was at fault in the collision. The
administrator of Reeves' estate notified Cotton States of the suit and
called upon it to defend and provide coverage for the claim of its own
insured.3 9 The court of appeals held that the exclusion was enforceable. 4 ° The court of appeals found that the exclusion was not camouflaged or unclear simply because it was within the "Amendatory
Endorsement," which was a substantial five-page document listed on the
typed declarations portion of the policy along with other documents as
"applicable forms."'
"'Every insurance contract shall be construed
according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the
endorsement
policy and as amplified, extended, or modified
' 42 by any rider,
or application made a part of the policy. ")

The court of appeals also addressed Coleman's argument that the
exclusion violated public policy because it limited liability coverage
stated on the declarations page.4 3 The court noted that "a claim
which is made by an insured against a permissive driver of his own
insured vehicle is not a liability claim by an innocent third party, but a

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 377, 525 S.E.2d at 742.
242 Ga. App. 531, 530 S.E.2d 229 (2000).
Id. at 531, 530 S.E.2d at 230.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 531-32, 530 S.E.2d at 230 (citing Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Burch, 222 Ga. App. 749, 476 S.E.2d 62 (1996)).
141. Id. at 532, 530 S.E.2d at 231.
142. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-16 (1996)).
143. Id.
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claim on behalf of the insured against his own insurance policy."144
Thus, the argument advanced by the Colemans failed.' 45
The court of appeals, in Stephens v. Conyers Apostolic Church,46
made a determination as to which of two policies applied to an accident. 147 The court held that defendant had a sufficient insurable
interest in the vehicle involved in the accident to authorize his decision
to insure the vehicle under his personal liability policy, even though he
did not own the vehicle.' 4 The court held that no legal or equitable
interest in the insured vehicle as property is necessary to support an
insurable interest regarding liability insurance.'4 9
In Progressive Preferred Insurance Co. v. Aguilera,5 ° the court of
appeals affirmed the trial. court's judgment that Progressive was
obligated to defend and provide coverage to Aguilera in a lawsuit
pending against him.' 5' Progressive unsuccessfully argued that
Aguilera had intentionally misrepresented who would be driving the
vehicle. Aguilera stated, by affidavit, that the Progressive agent told
him that Progressive did not need other drivers' personal information in
order to renew his policy. According to Aguilera, the agent reminded
him that Progressive had paid a previous claim on an accident involving
one of his employees not listed on the Progressive policy. Progressive's
agent stated that she told Aguilera that no one else should drive the
company vehicles until their personal information was added to the
policy. The trial court, in a nonjury proceeding, held that Progressive
should defend and provide coverage.'52 The court of appeals found
that the evidence supported the trial court's judgment."'
V.

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY

A property insurer unsuccessfully sought appointment of a receiver to
take charge of defendant's funds in Chrysler Insurance Co. v. Dorminey. '
Chrysler Insurance paid its insured as a result of a fire loss to
the insured's property. As subrogee of its insured, the insurance

144.
(1993)).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. (citing Spivey v. SaFeco Ins. Co., 210 Ga. App. 775, 776-78, 437 S.E.2d 641,644
Id.
243 Ga. App. 170, 532 S.E.2d 728 (2000).
Id. at 172-73, 532 S.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 172, 532 S.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 172-73, 532 S.E.2d at 731.
243 Ga. App. 442, 533 S.E.2d 448 (2000).
Id. at 446, 533 S.E.2d at 451.
Id. at 445, 533 S.E.2d at 450-51.
Id. at 446, 533 S.E.2d at 451.
271 Ga. 555, 522 S.E.2d 232 (1999).
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company filed a complaint against the insured's former comptroller
alleging that the comptroller set the fire in order to conceal a fraudulent
scheme to embezzle funds. Along with its complaint, the insurer asked
for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of funds that the
comptroller had received from the sale of her residence and other
assets.155 The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the receivership
was not warranted.15 6 The insurer was unable to show that its rights
could not otherwise be protected.' 57
Lee v.American Central Insurance Co."'5 dealt with several interesting issues including the duty of the insurer to investigate the policy
designations and questions of reformation of the insurance policy. Dr.
Lee owned title to premises in Macon, Georgia. Lee was also president
and majority stockholder of K. Lee Enterprises. K. Lee Enterprises
leased property to the Thams, principal officers of Fortune Garden, Inc.,
for use as a Chinese restaurant. The lease required the Thams to
maintain insurance on the building and provide K. Lee Enterprises with
a copy of the insurance policy. Mrs. Tham obtained an insurance policy
that listed Fortune Garden as a named insured and K. Lee Enterprises
as the mortgagee from the Kaplan Agency. Thereafter, the building was
totally destroyed by fire. The insurance company determined that the
principals of Fortune Garden intentionally set the fire and denied the
Thams' claim for coverage under the policy. The insurer also denied
Lee's individual claim because he was not listed in any fashion on the
policy. Lee claimed that the insurer negligently failed to investigate the
policy designations and failed to determine the true owner of the
property.5 9 The court of appeals held that "[a]n insurance company
that has had no business dealings with a third party to the insurance
policy owes no duty to that party to investigate the accuracy of the
policy's designation."6 ° The court found no evidence that Lee, as an
individual, had any interest in the insurance contract.' 6 ' The court
also refused to reform the insurance
policy because it found no mistake
16 2
that would allow for reformation.
As to the claim against the agent for failing to follow instructions to
add Lee as an additional insured, the court of appeals held that "an

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 555, 522 S.E.2d at 233.
Id. at 556-57, 522 S.E.2d at 234.
Id. at 556, 522 S.E.2d at 234.
241 Ga. App. 650, 530 S.E.2d 727 (1999).
Id. at 651, 530 S.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 651-52, 530 S.E.2d at 729-30.
Id. at 653, 530 S.E.2d at 730.
Id. at 652-53, 530 S.E.2d at 730.
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insurance agent is not liable for failing to follow instructions where the
mistake is readily apparent on the face of the policy and the insurer
receives a copy and does not, prior to the loss, ask that the policy be
changed."163 Here, the court found it was readily apparent that the
policy made no mention of Lee."
The Supreme Court of Georgia answered a certified question from the
Eleventh Circuit concerning coverage for claims of sexual harassment or
retaliation under an umbrella policy with an exclusion for "'bodily injury'
or 'personal injury'. . . to other employees 'arising out of or in the course
of their employment.'"' 6 5 The supreme court looked at the construction
of the terms "in the course of' and "arising out of employment" in the
context of workers compensation law and held that "the same reasoning
used in workers compensation cases has been held to be applicable to
general liability cases."'
The supreme court concluded that because
sexual harassment claims are construed under Georgia law as not
having arisen out of employment, the exclusion does not preclude
liability coverage for claims of sexual harassment.6 7 This holding
represents the first case in which sexual harassment claims were found
to be covered by insurance
in a long line of recent sexual harassment
6
8
opinions.1
coverage
From payment of an accidental death benefit to a finding that the
nonowned vehicle exclusion did not apply, the appellate courts continued
to find coverage when possible. Only in cases in which the policies were
written in very clear language, such as the "rented to others" exclusion,
and in cases in which the same exclusion had previously been upheld,
did the courts find no coverage.

163. Id. at 653, 530 S.E.2d at 731.
164. Id.
165. SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 293,293, 526 S.E.2d 555,
556 (2000).
166. Id. at 294, 526 S.E.2d at 557.
167. Id. at 294-95, 526 S.E.2d at 557.
168. See, e.g., Roe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 259 Ga. 42, 42, 376 S.E.2d 876, 877
(1989) (holding that child molestation is excluded by the intentional act exclusion); Hain
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 Ga. App. 486, 486-87, 471 S.E.2d 521, 522 (1996) (holding that
accident insurance does not cover intentional acts, such as sexual harassment).
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